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This paper describes the land property rights and tenure systems in the western 
escarpments of the Yemeni Highlands, and analyses the impact of land tenure 
arrangements and other socioeconomic factors on terrace maintenance.  
Owner-cultivated land is dominant in the terraced area, but more than one-third of 
the land is sharecropped.  Terraces cultivated by landowners have a lower number of 
broken walls per hectare than those cultivated by tenants under sharecropping 
arrangements.  This is more significant on sharecropped public (state and waqf) than 
private lands the reason being the lack of clearly defined responsibilities between tenants 
and landowners for maintenance and cost sharing.  These responsibilities are defined in 
the customary rules of land use, but uneven power distribution, which favors landlords, 
results in lack of clear rules and enforcement mechanisms. 
The study recommends government action in strengthening existing local 
institutions in documenting sharecropping contracts, improving and targeting agricultural 
credit services, instituting better price policies, and improving technologies for farmers.  
These measures will likely increase land users’ expected returns to investment, 
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1.    BACKGROUND 
 
The Republic of Yemen has limited arable land, which is estimated at 1.66 million ha.  In 
1996, 64 percent of the total area was cultivated.  About 25 percent of this land is in the 
form of man-made terraces in the highlands.  For centuries, Yemeni farmers have 
developed indigenous techniques of water-spreading and water-harvesting and 
construction of mountain terraces.  These and other community-based practices have 
enabled the long-term sustainability of agriculture in Yemen over many centuries. 
However, socio-economic changes including rapid urbanization, improved infrastructure, 
increased role of markets, and increased off-farm employment opportunities have 
increased the earnings in non-farm sectors, and hence led to a massive rural-urban 
migration and to an increase in agricultural labor wages.  Moreover, food aid, subsidized 
food supplies, and higher non-farm income reduced dependence on the land for food and 
income.  These factors have changed the traditional values which were the basis for 
community cohesion and management of community land resources.  
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Soil erosion due to land abandonment and lack of regular maintenance has caused 
degradation of terraces in the highlands, and valuable agricultural land is lost every year. 
The degradation of terraced lands in the mountains has serious consequences on the 
production systems downstream.  Lack of maintenance of individual terraces could result 
in the knocking over of other terraces down the slope, increased run-off damaging wadi 
banks, and flash floods affecting the spate irrigation systems on lowlands.  
There are four types of agricultural land ownership in Yemen; namely, private 
land (milk khas), state land (aradi al dawla), religious endowment land (aradi waqf), and 
communal land.  
Private land is the most predominant form of land ownership in the highlands.  
Given the inaccuracy of land registration and cadastral maps, exact data are not available. 
It is estimated that 81 percent of the land in the northern provinces is private land 
(Varisco 1985), with nearly half of this land owned by two hundred “important” families 
(Noaman, 1989).  For agricultural land, a registration system does not exist in Yemen. 
The Survey and Land Registration Authority (SLRA) in Sana'a deals only with urban 
land registration.   
Privately owned land includes alienation rights and unrestricted user rights.  
Rental agreements are allowed and can be paid in cash or kind (a share of the cultivated 
crop).  State land includes land that was confiscated by the imam prior to the 1962 
revolution from big landholders and tribes as settlement on disputes, and land that was 
confiscated from the imam's family after the revolution. It is estimated that state land 





The Authority of State Land, under the Ministry of Finance, is responsible for the state 
land, which is rented to tenant farmers with similar arrangements to tenancies on other 
land.  Because the Authority has no reliable records of the land, state land continues to be 
lost by grabbing.  
Religious endowment land, known as waqf land, is land donated by people for the 
enhancement of religious institutions such as mosques and schools.  This cannot be 
transferred by sale, gift or inheritance, and the close relatives of the person who donated 
the land have priority in renting waqf land for sharecropping.  The total waqf land is 
estimated at 10 to 15 percent of the agricultural land in Yemen (Noaman 1989).  The 
Ministry of Religious Endowment and Spiritual Guidance holds the endowment land. In 
strict terms, the state has no right to waqf land: it is simply a trustee.  Although the 
Ministry does not have central records of waqf land in the country, its offices in the 
provinces have some records of the lands (Ayan). Waqf land is cultivated by tenant 
farmers under sharecropping arrangements with the state, and the Ministry collects rents 
based on crop shares.  Similar to state land, waqf land is not registered with the SLRA. 
As a result, waqf land is also grabbed by big landholders without compensation to the 
previous holders.  The legal process to settle such disputes is often lengthy.  During the 
course of this study in August 1997, the Council of Ministers, in response to the 
increasing losses of waqf land, formed a committee to investigate the matter and to 
collect the land records from all provinces in the country.  This is not the first attempt 
carried out by the Government to collect the records, but previous attempts had only 





which are not utilized for crops and not used as catchment areas for terraces.  This land is 
used for grazing, and provides wood for construction and fuel.  It appears that these areas are 
open access resources and all the communities in the surrounding areas have the right to use 
them.  As this study investigates the impact of land tenure systems on terrace degradation in 
the cropped highlands of Yemen, communal land is not covered in this study. 
The main objectives of this study are to describe the land property rights and 
tenure arrangements over land and determine the effects of these and other 
socioeconomic changes on terrace maintenance in the western escarpments of Yemen. 
The hypothesis is that the prevailing sharecropping tenure arrangements in the area are 
not conducive to long-term investment in land improvements, resulting in terraces on 
sharecropped land being more degraded than those on owner-cultivated land.   
 
2.    STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGY 
STUDY AREA 
The study area lies within the two districts of Sharis and Kohlan in Hajja 
province, which is located in the western escarpments of Yemen.  The total agricultural 
area in Hajja province is estimated at about 124,600 hectares, of which 36 percent or 
46,000 hectares are predominantly cultivated terraces and wadi banks.  Rangelands 
comprise about 63 percent of the province or 78,000 hectares.  The study covers an area 
of about 53 km
2 and comprises five sub-districts (uzlah), one located in Sharis district 





steep slopes, which descend from mountain tops at 2,600 m above sea level to wadi 
bottoms at 900 m.  Agriculture is mainly rainfed, with annual average rainfall of 300-500 
mm falling in two seasons: spring (March-April) and summer (August-September). The 
main crops include sorghum, wheat, barley, lentils, dry peas, faba beans, maize, coffee 
and qat.  The total population was estimated at around 36,000 inhabitants in 1994 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, 1994).  Agriculture is the principal economic 
activity in the area, and  it engages 80 percent of the population.  However, because 
agriculture is unable to support the expanding population, there is increasing out-
migration from the region.  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Data collection for this study was done through informal and formal interviews.  
General information about the area including land ownership, customary tenure systems 
and crop shares were collected through informal interviews with farmers, key figures in 
local communities, local administration officials in key departments on land and 
agriculture, and other authorities such as judges.  It was gathered through group 
discussions and individual interviews using open-ended questions.  
Two formal surveys were conducted, one in the spring of 1997 and the other in 
the summer of 1998.  A sample of 56 farmers was interviewed on market day (Monday) 
at Kohlan district market in the spring of 1997.  Conducting successive interviews at the 
market was considered a good way of getting cross-sectional data from a sample of 





market is located in the study area where all categories of farmers come, and there was 
equal chance of selecting any category.  
In the second survey a sample of 100 farmers was randomly selected from four 
clusters of villages in the study area
1 (about 25 farmers from each cluster).  The clusters 
consist of four to five villages on different slopes.  The villages in each cluster were 
selected based on the size of the cultivated area.  A list of the farmers in each of the 
selected villages was made, and farmers were selected randomly from the list.  A pre-
tested questionnaire was used to collect data on holding size, land fragmentation, land 
property rights, tenure arrangements, crops, and sharecropping arrangements.  Data on 
degraded and broken terraces, farmers’ perceptions on constraints of terrace maintenance, 
and sources of finance for terrace repair were collected.  Farmers were also interviewed 
in their fields and in villages along a transect from a mountaintop down to a wadi bottom. 
The condition of terraces, which was measured by the number of broken terraces per 
hectare, was compared for holdings of different tenure arrangements.  
Sharecropping information was also collected from other areas in highland 
provinces through ad hoc farmer interviews to compare with the study area, but the 
detailed survey was carried out only in Kohlan and Sharis districts in Hajja province. 
                                                 





3.    LAND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
LAND OWNERSHIP, HOLDING SIZE AND LAND FRAGMENTATION  
All four types of land ownership (private property, state property, endowment 
land and communal land) exist in the study area.  Communal land was not covered in the 
survey; only cultivated land was considered.  Among cultivated holdings, private land is 
the predominant form of tenure, accounting for about 75 percent of the total area of the 
sample, while waqf land was estimated at 20-23 percent and state land at 2-5 percent 
(Table 1).  Farmers prefer sharecropping on waqf land because they feel more secure 
compared to sharecropping on state and private land, and some farmers regard it as 
private property.  However, a common understanding is that the heirs of the donor have 
prior rights for sharecropping on waqf land.  Thus, waqf land usually remains within the 
close family members of the donor. 
 
Table 1  Major types of land property rights and their importance in Yemen and 
Hajja province 
Type of land property  Sample farmers in Hajja
a Yemen
b 
 Percent  Percent 
Private 75  85 
Endowment (Waqf)  20-23  10-15 
State   2-5  3-5 
Source: 
a Estimates provided by local people, field survey 1997; 




The average holding size in the study area is 1.3 ha.  There is, however, a clear 





interviewed have holding sizes of less that one hectare, comprising only 25 percent of the 
area, whereas 15 percent of the farmers have about 41 percent of the area with a holding 
size of two to five hectares.  Smaller holdings are more frequent in the wadi banks where 
irrigated crops are cultivated, while larger holdings are more common in the upper and 
middle altitude slopes where rainfed farming is practiced.  Land concentration in Yemen 
has been documented in other studies and in some areas a few landlords own large tracts 
of the agricultural land (Noaman 1989).  Similarly, there are a few important families and 
prominent individuals who own large tracts in the study area.  
 
Table 2  Land holding size and distribution of the sample farmers in Hajja province, 
1998 
Holding Size  Percent area  Percent farmers 
Less than .5 ha  6  24 
0.5 -1 ha  19  31 
1-2 ha  34  30 
2-5 ha  41  15 
Source: Field survey 1998. 
 
Land fragmentation occurs in predominantly agrarian economies where a major 
section of the population is involved in agriculture.  It can affect the scale of agricultural 
production and reduce farmers' ability to invest in land improvement.  This is because it 
is a lot less efficient (in terms of supervision, input application time and transportation) to 
manage several small parcels scattered along a mountain slope than if they were 
consolidated.  
However, fragmentation may be a logical response of small farmers to 





fewer resources to invest, and their relative poverty results in lower capacity to absorb 
risks.  Furthermore, small farmers often do not have access to credit due either to 
infrastructural or bureaucratic obstacles, weakening their ability to invest and insure 
themselves against risk.  They may also discount the future more heavily than wealthier 
individuals due to their relative poverty, such that they are less inclined to invest for the 
long term.  Their reduced capacity to withstand risk may lead farmers to choose to 
fragment their plots in order to take advantage of land and microclimatic variation.  
In the farm survey conducted in summer 1998, sampled farmers cultivated 
holdings in an average of five locations, locally known as wattan, representing micro-
agroecologial areas.  Over 55 percent of the sample farmers cultivated holdings in three 
to five separate locations.  Some seven percent of the farmers had holdings in eight to 
nine locations (Table 3).  In the spring 1997 survey, eleven farmers were specifically 
asked about the number of parcels and the time spent walking to those parcels.  The 
average holdings of 1.8 ha owned by these farmers consisted of 45 terraces (abr), which 
were fragmented into four parcels each with an area of approximately half a hectare. 
Each of these parcels is located within a different micro-agroecological zone, or wattan, 
and farmers spend an average of 65 minutes in walking to reach each location.  This 
small sample may not represent all the farmers, but it indicates the efforts that some small 






Table3  Land segmentation of the sample farmers in Hajja Province, 1998 
Different locations (watans) that farmers cultivated  Tenure types that farmers hold 
Watans  Percent farmers  Number of 
tenure types 
Percent farmers 
1-2 14 1  28 
3-5 56 2  39 
6-7 23 3  23 
8-9 7 4  11 
Source: Field survey 1998. 
 
 
In the study area, application of inheritance law mainly results in land fragmentation. 
According to Islamic inheritance law, the number of heirs can vary depending on different 
situations.  For example, if the deceased person had no sons, other relatives will inherit, and 
since these may be numerous, land fragmentation increases.  According to a local judge, 
inheritance also results in many disputes over land property rights.  Land fragmentation 
occurs with sharecropped land as well because sharecropping tenancy is inheritable.  As a 
result, tenants cultivate increasingly smaller fields.  Attempts to consolidate land by 
exchange of parcels among farmers, locally known as monaqala, have been made, but are 
not commonly practiced, possibly due to the variations in land quality. 
Although the distribution of land into separate parcels located within different 
micro-agroecological zones reduces the risk due to weather fluctuations, all farmers 
interviewed indicated that they would prefer to have their plots consolidated.  However, 
the absence of effective land markets for sales and the social value of land may have 
prevented land consolidation.  In some cases, families keep their land under collective 






There are two main tenancy arrangements common in Yemen: fixed rent and 
sharecropping.  Fixed rent is more common in the irrigated systems, while sharecropping 
is found both in irrigated and rainfed areas.  
Although owner-cultivation is the predominant type of land tenure system in 
Yemen (82%)
2, sizeable areas of land are operated under sharecropping arrangements.  
The data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in Table 4 show average holding 
size and proportion of sharecropped land in five provinces in Yemen.  The sharecropped 
area in the highland provinces ranges from an estimated five percent in Hajja province 
 
Table 4  The total area and area cultivated by sharecropping in the highland 
provinces of Yemen 











 ha  Percent  ha  Percent  Percent 
Hajjja 124,594 7.5  1.5  5  19 
Mahwit 29,169  1.8  0.8  33  32 
Sana’a 380,726 22.9  2.6  9  26 
Thamar 138,220  8.3  1.5  31  37 
Ibb 101,521  6.0 0.7  26  26 
Taiz 123,432  7.4  0.9  14  17 
Average       18  35 




                                                 
2 Estimated from unpublished report: Agricultural Sector Study, Yemen, Annex 





to nine percent in Sana’a province and 33 percent in Mahwit.  In Hajja province, there is 
a higher percent of sharecropped land in the terraced area of the province (19 percent) 
than in the province as a whole. 
Generally, in Yemen, fixed-rent arrangements mostly occur in state and waqf land 
and in low land and irrigated areas.  However, since fixed-rent arrangements were not 
reported in the survey, they are not discussed in this paper. 
In the study area, 66-70 percent of the area cultivated by sample farmers was 
owner-cultivated, while 21-23 percent of the land was sharecropped private land, 10 
percent was sharecropped endowment (waqf) land and only one percent was 
sharecropped state land (Table 5).  The low reporting of state land in the samples may be 
the result of farmers’ unwillingness to report these lands.  As mentioned earlier, grabbing 
state and endowment lands in Yemen is a frequent problem due to lack of proper land 
registration and cadastral maps.  The total sharecropped land occupies 31-34 percent of the 
area and about 70 percent of the farmers cultivate land under some sort of sharecropping 
arrangement.  This demonstrates the significance of sharecropping, and hence, understanding 










Type of land tenure 
Area cultivated by 
sample farmers 
(1997 survey, n=56) 
Area cultivated by 
sample farmers 




 ha  Percent  ha  Percent  Percent 
1. Owner cultivated  119  69  63  66  85 
2. Sharecropped        
    private land 
36 21  22  23  57 
3. Sharecropped        
    Waqf land 
17 10  9.4 10  45 
4. Sharecropped        
    state land 
n.i n.i  1.1  1  11 
5. All sharecropped  
    land 
53 31  33  34  70 
Source: Survey data. n.i = no information was given.  The 1997 survey included owners 
of relatively large land; while the 1998 survey includes the cultivators only.  Thus, large 
land owners who usually rent out their land to tenants were not included in the sample.  
 
SHARES OF HARVESTED CROPS 
Sharecropping is an old system in Yemen and it has been adapted to many 
different situations.  It varies according to region, crop, type of land, availability of 
irrigation water, sharing arrangements on cost of production, and availability of other 
economic opportunities for landless farmers.  Sharecropping arrangements are 
conditioned on the agreement on sharing the cost of terrace maintenance.  Tenants’ shares 
of production and cost of terracing in different provinces is shown in Table 6.  The higher 
the tenants' share of the crops, the higher their share of terrace maintenance costs. 
The most common sharecropping arrangements in the study area are one-half to 
one-half, two-thirds to one-third and three-fourths to one-fourth of the harvested crop for 
the tenant and landowner, respectively.  These shares are based on the prevailing 





Table 6  Tenant’s share of production and costs of major terrace maintenance 
District/Province  Production share  Terrace repair cost share 
 Percent  Percent 
Kohlan/Hajja 50  50 
Bni Awan/Hajja  67  100 
Mahwit 67  50 
Jahala/Sana’a 50  50 
Raymah/Sana’a 67  100 
Humir/Thammar 50 67 
Otoma/Thammar 75 100 
Habali/Ibb 50  50 
Suhool/Ibb 67  100 
Saber/Taiz 67  50 
Source: Field survey 1997 
 
 
district apply the same ratio of shares.  Under rainfed conditions, tenants receive two-
thirds of the production of lentil, wheat, barley, and fenugreek, and half of the sorghum 
(with fodder) and millet.  In the flooded (spate irrigation) areas, tenants get one-third of 
the production of all field crops and coffee.  However, in the wadi, where irrigation water 
is available, tenants receive one-third, while landowners and pump owners divide the 
remaining two-thirds.  
Production estimates are mainly based on mutual trust (reported by 44 percent of 
the respondents), but often on private land a trusted person, the amin, or the owner either 
takes direct measurements (by volume) at harvest with the tenant (29 percent) or makes 
estimates by a field survey (19 percent).  The remaining eight percent of respondents 
reported using a combination of these methods.  On waqf land, the Ministry of 
Endowments and Spiritual Guidance sends experienced staff to make estimates of 





landlords to either demand higher shares or avoid the payment of their shares of terrace 
repairs.  Disagreement over the production estimation still remains a potential source of 
dispute with landowners.  
 
4.    SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING INVESTMENT IN 
IMPROVING TERRACED LAND  
SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGES 
Land property rights and tenure systems form part of the larger social, economic, 
political and legal systems of any society.  The socio-economic and political 
developments of Yemen during this century (particularly the northern part of the country) 
can be divided into three main periods.  These are the pre-imam era (before 1919), the era 
of imam Yahya (until the revolution of 1962), and after the revolution.  The pre-imam era 
was a time when the tribal system was dominant.  Land ownership was mainly divided 
along tribal and family lines, farming communities were relatively isolated and were not 
easily accessible, and production was mainly destined for subsistence use, although local 
markets were exchange places.  Generally, there were no income-earning opportunities 
outside agriculture and communities were largely self-sufficient in basic food supply.  
Community cohesion was necessary for survival.  Customary land tenure systems 
were based on the tribal law, known as urf, which was the basis for all common rules 
used to resolve disputes over ownership by local elders, who had knowledge of the land 
and property boundaries. Communities cooperated in building and maintaining the 





families in a community.  It is believed that the tribal land tenure system was based on 
ideals of equity, in which every tribal member had to have land to cultivate (Carapico and 
Tutwiler 1981).  In each community there was a Sayid or Faqih (now called amin al-
shari’), usually a man of religious significance  (imam of the mosque) who performed 
many religious functions, including inheritance and issuance of land inheritance 
certificates, known as fasl, which still is the basic document of land ownership held by 
descendents. The Faqih also prepared the land title documents known as basira. 
In the second period, 1919-1962, the political system was marked by the effort of 
the imam to establish his authority over these tribal communities.  In order to achieve 
absolute power and authority, the imam nominated local representatives, known as 
Sheikhs, who enforced the imam’s decrees and their interests with local militia supported 
by the imam’s army (Carapico and Tutwiler 1981).  The political and economic system 
under the imam heavily relied on land taxation.  The Sheikhs, their favored individuals 
and families acquired large tracts of land.  The system favored big landlords and the 
Sheikhs, who laid claim on all uncultivated land, sometimes required their tenants’ labor 
without payment.  
Although, more terraces were possibly built and cultivated during this era, 
because of the imam and his Sheikhs’ desire to capture the maximum possible 
agricultural surplus, the customary (tribal-based) land tenure systems were weakened by 





to collect Zakat taxes
3 for the imam and verify that tenants on the imam’s land paid their 
dues.  The amin
4 also issued land titles (basira).  
After the revolution of 1962, the imam’s land was converted into state farms and 
state land cultivated under sharecropping.  The amin al-wajibat became the government 
official responsible for collecting Zakat, keeping records of land transactions and issuing 
land titles.  There was no land reform and big landlords kept their land.  However, they 
could not enforce their own interests as before, at least not through government sanctions.  
The most important development was the rapid expansion of commerce and trade 
in the rural communities.  The second most important factor that affected land use during 
this era was the migration of labor from agriculture to other sectors in the local economy 
and abroad.  Figure 1 shows the population of Yemen and growth rates by sector since 
the 1960s.  The annual population growth rate has steadily increased from 1.8 percent in 
the 1960s to 3.3 percent in the 1990s.  The urban population grew at an annual rate of 6.1 
percent in the 1960s at a rate of about 10 percent in the early 1990s, while the rural 
population grew at a rate below the annual national average, ranging from 1.8 percent to 
3.3 percent per year from the 1960s through the 1990s.  
This massive rural-urban migration has affected land improvement in two ways. 
First, the supply of labor for dryland agriculture has declined, which has led to increased  
                                                 
3 Zakat is an annual payment provided as an act of worship and is proportional of 
one’s wealth. 
4 In some villages, the two positions (amin al-wajibat and amin al-shari’) are held 
by the same person; in other villages, the positions are held separately.  Currently the two 






























agricultural labor wages and raised the cost of land improvement.  Secondly, as urban 
centers have grown and gained more importance, government policies favor food policies 
that have taxed agriculture and reduced farm income, making land improvement less 
profitable.  The positive effects of migrants’ remittances flowing back to the rural areas 





The labor migration reached its peak in the 1970s economic boom of the Gulf 
States, when it is estimated that about 40 percent of the male labor force migrated. 
Dependency on land for food and income has declined, while wages in other sectors have 
increased more rapidly than farm wages.  During the interviews, farmers reported that in 
the 1950s and 1960s, their communities were self-sufficient in staple food grains, 
particularly sorghum, millet, and barley.  Some communities were self-sufficient in 
wheat, but today they rely on imported wheat and wheat flour from the market for 60 
percent of their staple food.  The subsidy on wheat and flour was reduced during the 
course of this study in June 1998.  Many farmers considered subsidized wheat, which 
also depressed the farm prices of other grains, most importantly sorghum, as the reason 
why many people left the land.  As a result of emigration and neglect, many terraces have 
been severely degraded and are no longer cultivable.  
These changes affected people’s attitude and the way in which they managed the 
land. In the past, it was ‘shameful’ for a tribesman to sell or leave his land uncultivated (Puin 
1984).  Today, however, people leave their land for better employment elsewhere, which 
results in the abandonment of terraces in the mountains.  Migrant labor has brought a great 
deal of wealth to the country, but since returns to investment have been higher in non-
agricultural sectors, the rural sector has lost in relative terms.  Investment in agriculture has 
occurred only in irrigated areas where it is still possible to generate positive returns. 
This process of social, economic and political transformation of Yemeni rural 
society has led to a decline in the resources devoted to terrace construction and 





customary land tenure system has apparently evolved within this broader social, 
economic and political development in the country.  Although it is difficult to definitively 
pinpoint the aspects of the customary tenure systems that have weakened, certainly the 
tribal law (urf) has been generally undermined by urbanization and labor migration as 
well as by government institutions that provide alternative legal frameworks and 
protection mechanisms.  
One example of customary law that has largely disappeared is the pre-Islamic 
tribal concept of protection (hijrah), which grants protection under tribal law to specific 
groups of people (for example those who are weak and do not have tribal ties for 
protection) and places such as markets, mosques, the house of faqih, etc (Puin 1984). 
Another example of the weakening of the customary land tenure systems is the gap 
between customary rules and what is actually practiced, particularly with respect to the 
cost-sharing of terrace maintenance between tenants and landlords. A breakdown in the 
enforcement of customary rules has reduced the maintenance of terraces and sometimes 
leads to their abandonment. 
RECIPROCITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (JAYSH AND AWN) 
Mountain terraces in Yemen were constructed over many centuries and 
maintained by community cooperation.  Jaysh and awn are two practices of community 
labor resource pooling used in the study area and in other parts of Yemen.  
Jaysh is a form of reciprocal labor exchange that takes place when a farmer or a 
household needs assistance for major terrace repairs, or other urgent situations such as 





household in the community of the need for collective action (jaysh) to repair damaged 
terraces, and provides food for the participants in the jaysh.  An announcement is made 
the following morning by drumbeats, and men, normally an adult male from each 
household, are called to join this community action.  Historically, participation in jaysh 
was considered voluntary, although not doing so was regarded as shameful.  
Awn is assistance that is offered by one farmer to another farmer on less urgent 
activities such as harvesting crops or repairing minor damage to terraces.  However, awn 
is considered a debt, and reciprocity is expected.  
These practices have largely disappeared due to migration, urbanization, and 
change of peoples’ attitude arising from increased off-farm opportunities, increased cost 
of labor and declining reliance on land for food. 
In spite of the decline in cooperative action in modern times, village crop rotation 
systems were found in the study area.  In these systems, the whole community adopts the 
same rotation on fields in the same area, watten.  Farmers believe that this practice will 
sustain the productivity of the soil and reduce the damage from pests, birds and other 
animals.  
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND LAND TENURE 
Flexibility of Customary Tenure Systems 
Customary land tenure systems in Yemen recognize that, in certain situations, 
investment in land improvements constitutes an assurance to tenants for the returns to 
their investment.  For example, special tenancy arrangements apply if rangeland or 





may be entitled to a larger share (75%) of the harvest, or they may keep the whole harvest 
for a period of four to six years to cover the cost of land reclamation.  The landowner will 
collect his share only after this period elapses.  It was also found that tenants who shift 
from cultivating cereals to qat and bear all investment costs can keep the whole 
production for 3–4 years,
5 after which the landowner receives one-third of the annual 
harvest.  Furthermore, the tenant establishes quasi-ownership rights to one-third of the 
value of the land in exchange for his investment.  In this case, if a landlord wishes to 
terminate a contract, the tenant will have to receive a payment equivalent to one-third of 
the actual market value of improved land.  This clearly provides tenants with incentives 
for investment.  If, on the other hand, the owner provides the investment capital, the crop 
shares will be 50:50 and the tenant does not establish property rights on the land.    
In other areas, for example in Sahool (Ibb province), tenants may claim ownership 
on one quarter of the reclaimed land if the landowner decides to terminate the tenancy 
arrangement.  In Hayma district (Sana’a province), tenants could claim half the land that 
they cultivated with coffee or qat if the landowner suddenly decides to terminate the 
tenancy arrangement, and in Raymah district (also in Sana'a province) the tenant’s share 
is 75 percent of the production of coffee, while it is 50:50 for annual food crops.  
This tendency for the customary tenure system to reward tenants for their long-
term investment in land improvement, particularly when it comes to reclamation of 
degraded terraces, is more common where high value crops like qat and coffee are  
                                                 
5 Qats start production after four years, so there is no payment to the landlord for 





cultivated and in more favorable environments along wadi banks where irrigation by spring 
water is available.  This is so because the potential profit and returns to investment are less 
risky than the investment in rainfed and more marginal areas where basic food crops are 
grown. Most terraces on lands where investments are profitable are well maintained unless 
the property rights are in dispute.  Qat, coffee and fruits are the main crops cultivated under 
sharing arrangements in these areas.  However, in marginal areas where there are inherently 
low and uncertain returns to investment, the customary tenure system provides limited 
opportunity for tenants to be compensated for their investments in land improvements. 
Twenty-nine holdings of rainfed land were reported in the survey to have 
undergone reclamation during the last five years.  Sixteen of these were reclaimed by 
land owners, while the remaining 13 were reclaimed by tenants: seven in sharecropped 
private land, five in waqf land and one in state land.  A higher proportion of owner-
cultivated holdings (23 percent) than sharecropped holdings (14 percent) were reclaimed. 
The reclaimed lands make up only about five percent of the cultivated area and 17 
percent of all holdings.  For the last five years, most of the reclaimed rainfed land has 
been planted with food crops under sharecropping arrangements.  Food crop cultivation 
on this land outweighs that of coffee or qat by a ratio of 6:1 on owner-cultivated holdings 
and 3:1 on sharecropped holdings.  The food crops grown are primarily sorghum and 
millet, which are mainly consumed at home.  Although from a limited sample, this is an 
interesting finding because one may assume that the low and variable returns from food 
crops under rainfed conditions would not have justified the investment in land 





For sharecropped land in the 350-400mm rainfall zone, negative and zero gross 
margins were estimated for rainfed sorghum and millet crops, respectively (FAO 1997). 
However, this calculation may have not fully accounted for the value of stalks and leaves 
of thinned sorghum that are used as feed, dry stalks and residues that are grazed out, and 
roots that are used as fuel. 
Rainfed food crops are still preferred by the majority of farmers.  About 82 
percent of 120 holdings, which constitutes 73 percent of the area of the sampled farmers, 
were sown with food crops.  Sixteen percent were divided between food crops and either 
qat, coffee or fruit trees, while the remaining two percent were not cultivated.  More 
economic research on land improvement in the mountainous areas of Yemen is needed to 
explain why more investment is not allocated to higher value non-staple crops. 
Investigations should include the impact of price, credit and infrastructure investment 
policies on crop choice, and returns to private investment in land improvement, 
particularly terrace maintenance. 
Sources of Finance for Land Improvement 
Although the customary land tenure systems in Yemen clearly reward investment 
in land reclamation and tree planting, the same does not automatically apply to the 
reconstruction and maintenance of broken terraces on cultivated land—at least in the 
study area.  The cost of building terraces was estimated at 160,000-170,000 Yemeni 
Riyals per ha (USD 1200-1700/ha) in 1998.  The costs of terrace repairs depend on the 
extent of damage and the nature of the site.  Repairs to severely damaged terraces could 





material (walling stones) and transportation of these materials.  This investment is 
typically too high for small farmers without access to external financial resources, 
particularly when crops such as qat do not produce returns until four years after planting.  
The sources of finance for land improvements (terrace repair and terraced land 
reclamation) for the last five years are given in Table 7.  Self-financing was the most 
common source of finance, being the source for 66 percent of the farmers who undertook 
land reclamation and 64 percent of those who engaged in terrace repair.  Loans from the 
local community were the second most important source of finance; 13 percent for land 
reclamation and 27 percent for terrace repairs.  Loans from the landlord and reciprocal 
labor exchange were the least important sources, though both were more important in 
land reclamation than in terrace repair.  This may be because there are established 
reciprocal labor pooling norms that apply to land reclamation, which involves building 
many terraces, unlike terrace repairs which do not exact labor obligations from others. 
Loans from formal credit sources were virtually non-existent, indicating the apparent 
absence of these services in the study area.  
 
Table 7  Farmers’ described sources of finance for terrace repairs for the last five 
years in Hajja province, survey 1998 




  Percent of farmers 
Own sources including off-farm support  66  64 
Local community, friends and relatives   13  27 
Loan from landlord  9  7 
Formal credit institutions  3  - 
Reciprocal arrangements of labor 
exchange (jaysh) 
9 2 





The fact that farmers are investing in land reclamation and development in these 
marginal areas suggests that there is likely unmet demand for formal agricultural credit 
institutions to improve services in these areas.  The Cooperative Agricultural and Credit 
Bank (CACB), which is the only formal agricultural financial institution in Yemen, 
provides credit to less than one percent of the farm families.     
Farmers’ perceptions of the constraints to terrace repair is presented in Table 8. 
Lack of financial resources is perceived by most farmers as the most important constraint, 
followed by lack of landowner support (19 percent) and lack of family labor (16 percent). 
Low returns to investment were not perceived as a major constraint by most of the 
farmers in the sample.  
 
Table 8  Farmers perceptions of the constraints to terrace repair 
Constraints  Farmers perceptions of constraints to terrace repair (n=84) 
 Percent  farmers 
Lack of financial resources   55 
Lack of landowner’s support    19 
Lack of family labor    16 
Dispute over land    6 
Low returns to investment    4 
Source: Survey 1998. 
 
 
5.    TERRACE MAINTENANCE AND LAND TENURE 
TENURE SECURITY 
Place, Roth, and Hazell (1994) have identified four elements of tenure insecurity: 





assurance of existing rights; and 4) high cost of enforcing rights. In the study area, tenure 
insecurity can be attributed to the last three elements.  
Three types of tenancy contracts for sharecropping are identified in the study area: 
namely, open, long-term, and short-term agreements.  Tenants and landowners sign 
written contracts, waraqat eyjar, on open and long term tenancy arrangements.  The 
contract is prepared by a trusted individual in the communities (amin).  The period of 
tenancy agreement is not mentioned in the contract for open tenure, although the 
arrangement is intended to last for years, whereas the period of tenancy is stated in the 
contract for long-term tenure arrangements.  Tenancy agreements with a duration of 20, 30, 
and 50 years are found in the study area.  Both open and long-term contracts are inheritable.  
Short-term tenancy arrangements are least common.  They last only for one season or one 
year, and a written contract is not required.  These contracts are mainly limited to rainfed 
areas.  The open and long-term arrangements are prevalent in the study area (86 percent of 
tenants), while short-term contracts are held by only 14 percent of the sample.  
Many of the farmers interviewed indicated that tenure security, in the sense of having 
a sufficiently long-time horizon to reap the benefits from their investments, was not a major 
problem.  The sharecropping arrangements for almost three-quarters of the tenancies (73 
percent) were retained for more than 10 years, about 16 percent of the sharecropping 
tenancies were held between five and 10 years, while only 11 percent have been held for less 
than five years (Table 9).  Furthermore, all the sampled farmers saw no problem in 
continuing to hold these rights.  Hence, tenure insecurity, in terms of duration in rights, does 





Table 9  Distribution of duration of tenure holdings for different parcels of land in 
Hajja province, 1998  












Years cultivated  Percent farmers   
More than 10 years  72  71  87  73 
Between 5-10 years  17  18  -  16 
Less than 5 years  11  11  13  11 
a The sample was 84 farmers, but only the valid observations for the duration of 
cultivation on each tenure type are reported. 
Source: survey 1998. 
 
 
Tenancy contracts generally state that the tenure agreement is based on the 
customary rules and regulations, but do not actually specify what these rules are.  A 
typical contract states the names of the landowner and the tenant, location of the farm and 
boundaries with other farms, and sometimes the shares of the two parties.  It also states 
that the tenant has the responsibility for keeping the land in a cultivable condition 
(eqamet elmal).  The crops to be cultivated on the land are not specified in the contract, 
nor are cost-sharing arrangements for terrace maintenance.  The reasons why these 
contracts do not contain such stipulations may stem from landowners’ unwillingness to 
accept such inclusions.  The result is that tenants lack the ability to enforce their 
customary rights over the landlords’ contribution to terrace maintenance. 
Another reason for the increase in tenure insecurity is the weakening of customary 
law enforcement capabilities.  Traditionally, land tenure arrangements were bound by an 
oral agreement based on trust and community norms, which provided security for the 





not an honorable thing to do.  For example, it is commonly held that as long as a tenant 
cultivates the land and pays the owners’ share, there is no reason to terminate the 
contract.  However, increasing land scarcity due to high population growth (3.5 percent 
per year) and the resulting increase in the number of rural households and demand for 
food, renders the traditional methods of keeping track of land holdings as well as 
enforcement of customary law ineffective.  As a result, most of the disputes currently end 
up in court.  In addition, court rulings are made more difficult by the lack of land 
registration and cadastral maps.  
There is also evidence that landowners, considered to have more power than 
tenants, are exploiting the situation to their advantage.  Tenants are more dependent on 
land for household income compared to landowners.  In order not to lose their tenurial 
rights, they may have forgone some of the rights that the customary land tenure system 
granted them.  Our study indicates that it is a commonly held view that landowners’ 
rights override tenants’ rights: 51 percent of surveyed farmers stated that landowners 
always win any land dispute simply because, as they put it, “it is their property”.  This 
implies that tenant farmers have, or at least perceive that they have, weaker access to 
legal services than landlords or that power imbalances produce skewed legal outcomes 
that favor landowners.  This lack of assurance of customary rights is likely to diminish 
tenants’ incentives to invest in land improvements, such as terrace maintenance.   
In summary, although there is tenure security in terms of the duration of 
customary rights for tenants, the extent of these rights is subject to negotiation.  The lack 





tenure insecurity.  Tenants tend to surrender some of their tenurial rights in the event of 
dispute due to their relatively weaker position and the high cost of enforcement.  This 
reduces the incentives to invest in terrace maintenance.  
Formalization of land registration is evolving slowly. At the local level, title deeds 
(basira) are the only documents that prove individual land ownership.  Title deeds, which 
are locally prepared, usually at the sub-district level, record cadastral information, 
including farm boundaries.  This document is accepted in court litigations.  As a result of 
increasing land scarcity, false title deeds are increasingly produced, leading to more 
conflicts over land ownership and farm boundaries. This results in title deeds being a less 
reliable proof of land ownership.  
In order to address the problem of land registration, the Ministry of Local 
Administration asked the amin to keep records of all land transactions at the sub-district 
level, such as land sales and tenancy arrangements.  Since 1990, the government has 
strongly recommended that title deeds be endorsed by the court to assure that they are 
valid.  The government recommends the use of written contracts on land tenure 
agreements to reduce disputes.  Hence, the local administration authorities at sub-district 
levels (Uzla) are required to endorse and keep records of tenancy contracts and other land 
transactions.   However, at present the institutional capacity at the local and provincial 
levels is not sufficiently strong to effectively document all contractual arrangements and 





CUSTOMARY RULES OF TERRACE MAINTENANCE 
The responsibility for terrace maintenance between tenants and landowners is 
based on customary rules.  According to one rule, the tenant bears the full cost of “minor” 
damages that are considered part of necessary farm husbandry and shares equally with 
the landlord the cost of “major” damages caused by heavy storms or floods.  Another 
common rule is that tenants repair broken terraces and recover their costs by retaining the 
whole harvest for two to five years.  According to farmers interviewed in this study, 
however, these common rules are not followed.  
One reason may be that the rules are not stated in written tenure contracts, which 
could provide tenants with greater assurance and clearly indicate landowners‘ 
obligations.  Instead, the contract states that the tenant should keep the land in a 
cultivable condition.  This is based on a widely held view that it is the responsibility of 
the tenant to return the land “in good condition” (eqamet elmal).  Furthermore, the 
definition of minor and major damages may be contested.  
Farmers in Hajja and Mahwit provinces and western districts of Sana'a province 
have developed the term mathber to describe when a portion of the terrace wall falls and 
the soil behind the wall is washed away.  Partial fall of terrace walls without soil erosion 
is not considered a mathber.  Farmers indicated that damages on terrace walls that require 
no more than two to three workdays of labor and are within the range of “minor” 





DEVIATIONS FROM THE COMMON RULES 
Although the prevailing view is that the responsibility for terrace maintenance is 
determined according to customary rules, there is a lack of clarity in the responsibility for 
terrace maintenance.  Unlike the customary rules governing sharecropping and land 
reclamation investment, those governing terrace repair are less clear and their application 
is contested.  The customary rule that farmers repair damaged terraces and the landlord’s 
portion of the cost be deducted from the production share based on mutual agreement is a 
way to avoid delays in terrace repairs.  However, this practice has diminished mainly 
because of landlords’ unwillingness to pay their share of the cost.  Landlords’ reluctance 
to support terrace repairs is attributed to low expected returns to investment, as a result of 
low yields, weather variations, and steadily increasing cost of labor. 
The fact that tenants have to repair all "minor" damages and keep the land in a 
cultivable condition places landlords in a strong position.  Although tenants could, in 
principle, withhold the landowner's share if the latter's share of terrace maintenance is not 
paid, they may be in a weaker position to do so, given their greater reliance on the land 
for family livelihood.  Tenants perceive that proper enforcement of the 50:50 rule would 
increase the incentives to invest in land improvements, particularly terrace maintenance.   
In the survey conducted in 1998, about 36 percent of all tenant farmers stated that 
landowners rarely or never pay their share of terrace repairs, 33 percent stated that 
landowners sometimes pay part or the full share of the cost, but only 31 percent stated 
that landowners pay their full share of the cost at all times.  In the spring 1997 survey, 





subtract the shares of major terrace maintenance costs from the harvest shares. 
Meanwhile, a similar percentage indicated that they have to bear the whole cost of both 
minor and major damages.  Nearly seven percent of tenants indicated that the waqf 
authority refused to share the costs.  But, four percent of the tenants did not try to ask the 
waqf authority, nor were tenants either asked to repair damages that occurred more than 
five years ago.  Where landlords avoid and sometimes refuse to share with tenants the 
costs of major damages, the tenants in turn see no reason to carry out the repairs without 
assurance that they will receive the returns from their investment.  As a result, some 
terraces continue to deteriorate due to lack of proper maintenance. 
Those tenants who reported that landlords do not fully pay their share of the 
terrace-repair costs were asked what they would do in the event that landowners did not 
contribute.  Fifty-nine percent stated that they would either leave the land, do nothing, or 
carry out the repairs alone.  Twenty-two percent said they would take the matter to the 
authority, and 19 percent said they would deduct the costs from the landlord’s share of 
the harvest.  However, deductions from landlords’ crop shares at harvest without consent 
could result in a major dispute.  
The reasons given by the farmers behind landowners’ reluctance to share terrace 
repair costs is given in Table 10.  The main reasons are lack of resources and low land 
productivity (43 percent), the owner does not perceive adequate returns to investment (22 
percent), the owner is not giving priority to the land (13 percent), and the owner does not 
want to have his crop share deducted for terrace repair because of his perception that the 





production estimates leads some landlords to delay or refuse to pay their share for terrace 
maintenance.  The logic, from the landlord’ point of view, appears to be that tenants 
would have no choice but to repair the terraces alone.  
These responses should be interpreted with caution because tenants may want to 
avoid giving any negative information about their landowners.  All in all, tenant farmers 
perceive that the customary rules on terrace maintenance are not followed because of 
landowners’ increasing reluctance to contribute.  Low expected returns and increasing 
costs of terrace repair due to high labor costs are likely to add to their unwillingness to 
contribute.  However, lack of clarity on the responsibility for terrace repair and lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms reinforce this behavior.    
 
Table 10  Farmers’ explanations for landowners’ unwillingness to share terrace 
repair costs (sample = 82 farmers) 
Reason Percent 
   
Lack of resources and low land productivity  43 
Owner does not perceive adequate returns to his investment   21 
Owner is not giving priority to the land  13 
Owner does not want to get his crop share deducted for terrace repair because 
of his perception that the tenants benefit more from the land 
11 
Owner does not need the land  4 
Owner is not getting his proper share  4 
Owner gave the land in good condition and it is tenant’s responsibility to take 
care of it and return in good condition 
2 
Due to dispute in inheritance  2 
Source: Survey 1998. Most respondents (70%) cultivate own plots as well as 
sharecropping plots, with an average of 3 tenure types per respondent, hence, it was 







INCIDENCE OF BROKEN TERRACES 
Table 11 shows the average number of broken terrace walls on farms of different 
land tenure systems for two samples from the farmers in the study area.  In the 1998 
survey, a higher number of broken terraces per hectare were recorded for sharecropped 
private (23), waqf (34) and state (60) lands than for owner-cultivated lands (21).  The 
results of a t-test for mean differences are given in Table 12.  The mean difference in 
broken terraces between owner-cultivated and sharecropped private land was not 
significant, but the difference between owner-cultivated and sharecropped public land 
(waqf and state combined) was significant.  The higher number of un-repaired terraces in 
the sharecropped land can be explained by the increasing tenure insecurity arising from 
the lack of clear rules and responsibilities on terrace maintenance, the increase in 
contestation of current rules, and the lack of efficient enforcement mechanisms for 
ensuring landlords pay their share of the costs.  
 
Table 11  Average number of broken terrace walls on farms of different land tenure 
systems 








Mathaber per ha 
  1997 1998 1997  1998  1998  1997 1998 
Owner-cultivated land  1.35  0.90  16  19.5 (15)  7 (5)  12  21 
Sharecropped private land  0.43  0.45  8  10.2 (8)  10 (7)  19  23 
Sharecropped Waqf land  0.3  0.25  8  8.6 (7)  18 (22)  25  34 
Sharecropped state land   n.i  0.12  5  7.2 (8)  18 (8)  n.i  60 
All sharecropped land   n.i  .55    12.7(13)  18 (18)    29 
Source : Field surveys in 1997 (n=56) and 1998 (n=84). n.i = no information.  The 1997 









Table 12  T-test values for mean differences for the number of broken terrace walls 
(mathabir) reported by farmers on lands with different tenure arrangements  















-0.2 82  ns  -3.52  70  0.001 
Sharecropped 
private land 
_ _  _  -2.52  44  0.015 
Source: Survey 1998. 
 
 
During group discussions, farmers ranked state land as the most degraded land 
followed by the waqf land, while private land was considered to be in a relatively better 
condition.  Although the small size of public land in the sample makes the comparison 
difficult, the main explanation for the higher number of degraded terraces on public land 
(state and waqf combined) is the lack of clear agreement between tenants and the state on 
maintaining the terraces.  The waqf office told the researchers that they have started 
reducing their contributions to terrace maintenance because of declining revenue.  
The data collected during the survey are farmers’ responses, which provided only 
respondents’ perceived assessment of terrace degradation.  Objective assessments of the 
extent of terrace degradation, which requires standardized indicators of degradation, will 
be necessary in future studies.
6 
The cumulative average numbers of broken terrace walls per hectare that occurred 
until 1997 for different land tenure systems are shown in Figure 2.  The figure shows that 
broken terraces are increasing over time in all types of land tenure systems, but relatively 
                                                 





Figure 2  Cumulative broken terrace walls in fields of different land tenure 






















more so on sharecropped land than on owner-cultivated land.  The relatively higher 
number of broken terrace walls detected in 1997 compared to that which occurred in 
1996 is partly the result of the 1997 survey being taken prior to crop harvesting.  Terrace 
repairs are usually postponed until the crops are harvested when tenants will be able to 
receive the landowner's share of repair costs as a portion of the harvested crop.  The 
increasing number of broken walls recorded up to 1996 indicates the slow repair responses to 
terrace damage.  Tenant farmers consider many of the un-repaired broken terraces that 
occurred in the past as major damages which are the responsibility of landlords.  In the case 
of owner-cultivated land, damaged terraces are considered expensive to repair and lack of 





























6.    CONCLUSIONS 
Our study has investigated the effects of land tenure and other socioeconomic 
factors on terrace maintenance in the Hajja province, in the western escarpments of 
theYemeni highlands.  The investment in land improvement, particularly terrace 
maintenance in the dry highlands of Yemen has declined for the last 30 years.  The 
number of abandoned, degraded and unrepaired terraces found in the study area clearly 
indicates this trend.  Although the number of degraded terraces per hectare is increasing 
over time in all land tenure systems, the number of broken terraces in sharecropped 
public (state and waqf) land is significantly higher than that in owner-cultivated land. 
This can be attributed to the slow response by the state and the waqf authorities to 
undertake terrace repairs.  The incidence of degraded terraces on private sharecropped 
land is not significantly higher than that on owner-cultivated land.  
Although tenure security is not a problem in terms of length in the duration of 
tenure, tenants’ weak position vis-à-vis landlords create other forms of tenure insecurity. 
The study indicates that lack of clear agreements and different interpretations of 
customary rules governing terrace repairs and cost-sharing arrangements between tenants 
and landlords, and lack of enforcement mechanisms have created insecurity in terms of 
the number of absolute rights, assurance of existing rights and the cost of enforcing 
rights.  The uneven power distribution, which favors landlords, has reinforced the lack of 
clear rules and made enforcement difficult.  All of these factors have affected the 





Apart from tenure security, investment in terrace improvement depends on the 
cost of borrowing, expected returns to investment and the livelihood dependence on the 
land.  Certainly, farmers in the study area still invest in terrace maintenance and in 
building new terraces in order to secure their livelihoods.  However, because of the 
insecurity that tenants feel, the variability of returns due to weather fluctuations, the high 
labor cost of terrace maintenance due to massive out-migration, and the limited access to 
credit, investment in terrace maintenance in the study area is lower than it would have 
been without these constraints.  
Our study also found that incentives from high value tree crops like coffee and qat 
have led tenants and landlords to reach mutual agreements on sharing the costs and benefits 
of long-term investment in land improvement.  Such arrangements, however, do not apply to 
the land cultivated with annual food crops where returns are lower and less certain.  
The continuous degradation of terraces in the Yemen highlands has serious 
environmental and economic implications.  Terrace degradation not only results in net 
arable land loss in the highlands, but it also affects downstream slopes, produces erosion 
on wadi banks, and contributes to flash floods in the spate irrigation systems, all of which 
could cause irreversible damage to Yemen’s natural resource base and endanger the 
country’s long-term food production capacity.   
The results of this study lead to the following recommendations: 
•  Government action in strengthening existing local institutions in 
documenting sharecropping contracts, which will facilitate the 





•  Improved and targeted agricultural credit services and better price policies 
that will increase farm income and counterbalance the negative effects of 
food subsidies and rising terrace repair costs brought on by increased 
wages and male out-migration, 
•  Research to develop improved production technologies and more 
profitable land use options to increase private investment in land 
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